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pabilities) is proposed as an "after market" to allow airlines to purchase freely and sell primary market slots to each other. This continuous after market exchange would provide the institutional means by which individual airlines would acquire those slot packages which support their individual flight schedules. Thus, an airline that acquired slots at Washington National which did not flight-match the slots acquired at O'Hare could either buy additional O'Hare slots or sell its excess Washington slots in the after market. Although GIP's proposed after market permits airlines to exchange slots freely and thereby acquire the appropriate slot packages, it suffers from two disadvantages.
(1) Individual airlines may experience capital losses and gains in the process of trading airport slots in the after market. Thus, an airline with an excess of A slots and a deficiency of B slots may discover in the after market that the going price of B slots is unprofitably high (for that particular airline), while excess A slots can be sold only at a loss. (2) It costs resources to trade in the after market. Hence, to the extent that slots are not allocated to the appropriate packages in the primary market, the cost of participating in the combined primary-after market mechanism is increased.
Ideally, the primary market would allocate slots in the appropriate packages initially with the after market performing only two functions (i) marginal corrections in primary market misallocations, and (ii) slot allocation adjustments due to new information not available at the time of the primary auction. Thus, a sudden grounding of all DC-10 aircraft would leave Continental Airlines with a surplus of O'Hare runway slots, which could be sold in the after market to airlines not affected by the DC-10 grounding.
In this article, we address the problem of designing a "combinatorial" sealed-bid auction to serve as the primary market for allocating airport slots in flight-compatible packages for which individual airlines would submit package bids. The objective is to allocate slots to an individual airline only in the form of those combinations and subject to those contingencies that have been prespecified by the airline.
The auction optimization mechanism
* To increase the overall efficiency of the slot allocation mechanism suggested by GIP (1979), and to decrease its reliance on an after market, we have developed an optimization model with the following features for use in a computer-assisted primary sealed-bid auction market: (a) direct maximization of system surplus in the criterion function; (b) airport coordination through consideration of resource demands in logically packaged sets; (c) scheduling flexibility through contingency bids on the part of airlines. The contingency bids expressed in the set of logical constraints have one of two format types: "Accept no more than p of the following q packages." or "Accept package V only if package W is accepted." The first type is identical in format to any of the resource constraints. For example, suppose an airline bids ca on package a, Cb on package b, and specifies either a or b, but not both. The added constraint is then written xa + Xb < 1. The second type can be converted to this format through a simple variable transformation. For example, suppose an airline bids as in the previous example, but specifies b only if a. By creating the package ab with Cab = Ca + Cb, package b can be eliminated from consideration. The added constraint becomes xa + Xab < 1.
In a manner analogous to the parallel independent slot auctions suggested by GIP (1979), sealed bids (cj) for packages (j) and the contingency constraints (k) specified by each airline are used to parameterize the model and determine an "optimal" primary allocation. The problem which results is recognized as a variant of the set packing problem with general right-hand sides. It can be solved, as was done for the experiments reported in Section 3, with a specialized algorithm developed by Rassenti (1981) . A problem of the enormous dimensions dictated by even a four-city application (perhaps 15,000 constraints and 100,000 variables) will present a significant challenge for the finest configuration of hardware and software available. Fortunately, a practicable solution within 1 or 2% of the linear optimum, and very often the optimum itself in the discrete solution set, is almost assuredly achievable in a reasonable amount of time.
Given the solvability of P and its potential for ensuring an efficient primary allocation, there remain several questions: how to induce bidding airlines to reveal their true values; how to price allocated slots; and how to divide income among the participating airports. We suggest a resolution of these concerns with the following procedure: (1) Determine a complete set of marginal (shadow) prices, one for each slot offered. (2) Charge any airline whose package j was accepted in the solution to P a price for j equal to the sum of the marginal prices for the slots in that package. This provides the uniform price feature that has demonstrated good demand revelation behavior in single commodity experiments (GIP, 1979). (3) Return to any airport whose slot i was included in some accepted package j an amount equal to the marginal price for i. Such a scheme will guarantee that the price paid for an accepted package is less than (or rarely equal to) the amount bid for that package.
If problem P were a linear program, the determination of the suggested set of shadow prices would be a trivial and well-solved matter. Discrete programming problems, however, present special difficulties with respect to shadow pricing. Consider, for example, a discrete project selection problem with a single resource constraint: 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0) , and obviously no critical ratio exists which separates projects that are chosen from those that are not. Figure 1 illustrates these solutions. In the traditional sense, Lagrangian multipliers for an integer program may not exist;' that is, no set of prices will support the optimal division of packages into accepted and rejected categories. Therefore, it is possible that a package bid that is greater than its shadow resource cost will be rejected, while another package bid that is also greater than its shadow cost is accepted. In the experiments reported in Section 3, we provided subject bidders with a guideline explanation of these cases. This allows subjects to select strategic or best reply (Cournot) responses if they wish.
With this problem in mind, the following two pseudo-dual programs to P were developed to define bid rejection prices (problem DR) and acceptance prices (problem DA) that will serve as bidding guidelines for individual agents. 2 A referee suggests that "if this mechanism were implemented, it would be used over a long period of time with substantial sums at stake and one would expect some investment in learning about the use of strategic maneuvers." Some comment on this view is important because it represents a widely shared belief among economists. We think it is at least as likely-the evidence seems to suggest that it is more likely-that the airlines would compete away any rents which they now capture from airport slot resources. In fact, a very reasonable hypothesis, given the immense uncertainty as to what airport slot combinations are actually worth (these are well defined in our experiments), might be that airline bids would actually exceed those levels that would sustain long-run profitability. If the recent, and continuing, vigorous price competition among airlines in passenger ticket sales is any indication, then this last hypothesis is quite likely to be supported. Braniff Airlines has just filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in an environment in which "it has been widely asserted that part of We conjecture that this is why GIP do not observe significant underrevelation of demand in laboratory experiments with one commodity auctions. Since the combinatorial auction we suggest for the airport slot problem is far more complex than any of the single commodity auctions that have been studied, we would expect to observe at least as much demand-revealing behavior in our auction as in the others. Since this is both an open and a behavioral question, we devised a laboratory experimental design to compare our combinatorial auction procedure with the procedure proposed in GIP (1979).
Experimental results
* Eight experiments were conducted using students with economics and engineering backgrounds. Each experiment consisted of a sequence of market periods in which objective economic conditions remained constant in successive periods for the six participants. The first period was always considered a learning period (no payoff), and the number of periods completed was time dependent (3-hour limit). Individual subjects were paid the difference between the assigned redemption value of packages and the prices paid for packages in the market (Smith, 1976) . Subjects' earnings varied between $8 and $60, depending on individual endowed valuations and subject and group bidding behavior. A 2 X 2 X 2 experimental design was employed. The three factors were: (1) GIP (control) versus our RSB (treatment) primary auction; (2) subjects "experienced" versus "inexperienced;" (3) combinatorial "complexity" (easy versus difficult) of resource utilization.
The GIP mechanism employed copied that suggested and used by GIP (1979). The first two RSB experiments used marginal package pricing and the "easy" combinatorial design, while the second two used the marginal item pricing scheme described in Section 2 and the "difficult" combinatorial design.3 The term "experience" indicates previous participation in either a control or treatment version of an experiment, but even "inexperienced" subjects generally had some experience with other less complicated decisionmaking experiments such as a single commodity auction. Combinatorial "complexity" refers to the degree of difficulty a subject would encounter in attempting to shuffle two to four sellers compete away all except competitive rents in a variety of distinct pricing institutions. In the experiments reported here subjects were quite active in attempting manipulative strategies early in each experiment. These strategies tended to be abandoned over time, as indicated by the tendency for resource prices (Table 3) to increase in successive periods.
3 Appendix A contains the instructions and forms used in the experiments in which the primary market priced items marginally. The instructions and forms used in our GIP experiments and in the two RSB experiments that priced packages marginally can be obtained by writing Smith at the University of Arizona. Appendix B contains the contrasting package valuation designs used in the "easy" and "difficult" combinatorial treatment.
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slots from one package use to another for the purpose of making a redemption claim or a purchase or sale in the after market. It has two components: the amount of package repetition among various agents and the amount of item repetition within any agent's packages. Table 1 gives the observed efficiency after primary and secondary markets for each cell of the design. The trial (zero) period results are not listed. Efficiency is defined as total subject payoff (realized system surplus) divided by total theoretical payoff (system surplus computed by assuming full demand revelation). The data support several important hypotheses. The overall efficiency of the RSB mechanism is generally greater than that of the GIP mechanism. It is achieved without the uniformly strong dependence on the secondary market displayed by the GIP mechanism. The ability of subjects to include contingency bids in appropriate situations, though not included in the experiments conducted, should serve to accentuate this effect. Market experience seems a significant factor in determining the efficiency of either mechanism. Learning is in evidence during the multiperiod course of each experiment. The RSB mechanism, however, seems to require less learning and displays quicker achievement of high efficiency. This fact suggests that the RSB mechanism will adapt more efficiently to changing economic conditions-an important criterion in judging the performance of any mechanism.
The sample size is too small, with one observation per cell, to test for the significance of each "treatment." But by aggregation across all treatments except the bidding mechanism, we can report a nonparametric sign test of the null hypothesis that the fourth period difference in efficiency between RSB and GIP is equally likely to be positive or negative, as against the research hypothesis that there is a positive difference. From Table  1 , for the primary market, all four paired differences are positive, and the null hypothesis is rejected at p -.0625. In the after market, three of the four paired differences are positive, and the null hypothesis can be rejected only at p = .25. This is consistent with our prior expectation that the principal advantage of RSB over GIP is to improve primary market allocation sufficiently to make after market exchange unnecessary. Thus, comparing after market efficiency with primary market efficiency in period 5 across all RSB experiments, we observe no difference.
The more detailed breakdown of surplus presented in Table 2 adds further support to these observations. Uniformly more agents were in debt after the GIP primary market. On several occasions, an agent who needed to participate in multilateral trades for gains in the GIP secondary market was caught short of completion (e.g., GIP-inexperiencedeasy period 1). This is a difficulty to be reckoned with in any independent slot marketing scheme.
Speculation is defined as the purchase of a package by an individual for whom the package has no redemption value. Such a purchase can be profitable only through resale at a higher price in the after market. Because of the extremely high efficiency realized in the primary RSB allocation, speculative behavior is very risky (e.g., RSB-inexperiencedeasy period 5 and difficult period 4). Primary prices and allocations are too near optimal to yield much speculative profit, and combinatorial problems are encountered with after market multilateral trade. Table 2 also reinforces the notion that experience is less important in the RSB mechanism. Under the more incentive-compatible conditions of RSB, there was 95% demand revelation for nonspeculative bids in the final period.
The difficulty with determining item values by independent auctions is emphasized by Table 3, which traces prices by period. The absolute deviation from theoretical values is much larger for the GIP mechanism. In fact, the task of estimating item value from package redemption value proved too much for inexperienced GIP subjects under difficult conditions where a market collapse occurred. Unless there is demand overrevelation (bidding in excess of value), it is impossible for this situation to occur in the RSB mechanism, where the optimization routine makes an "intelligent" pricing decision. 
Finally, combinatorial complexity seems to lower GIP mechanism efficiency by a significant amount, while the performance of the RSB mechanism appears not to deteriorate and perhaps even to improve. This is to be expected if we are correct in our conjecture that the decision costs potentially associated with this factor are borne by the computer in the RSB mechanism. 4. Alternatives for implementing an airport slot auction * To our knowledge, this study constitutes the first attempt to design a "smart" computer-assisted exchange institution. In all the computer-assisted markets known to us in the field, as well as those studied in laboratory experiments, the computer passively records bids and contracts and routinely enforces the trading rules of the institution. The RSB mechanism has potential application to any market in which commodities are composed of combinations of elemental items (or characteristics). The distinguishing feature of our combinatorial auction is that it allows consumers to define the commodity by means of the bids tendered for alternative packages of elemental items. It eliminates the necessity for producers to anticipate, perhaps at substantial risk and cost, the commodity packages valued most highly in the market. Provided that bids are demand revealing, and that income effects can be ignored, the mechanism guarantees Pareto optimality in the commodity packages that will be "produced" and in the allocation of the elemental resources. The experimental results suggest that: (a) the procedures of the mechanism are operational, i.e., motivated individuals can execute the required task with a minimum of instruction and training; (b) the extent of demand underrevelation by participants is not large, i.e., allocative efficiencies of 98-99% of the possible surplus seem to be achievable over time with experienced bidders. This occurred despite repeated early attempts by inexperienced subjects to manipulate the mechanism and to engage in speculative purchases.
The problem of allocating airport time slots requires improved methods (GIP, 1981), and the problem has grown from bad to worse in the aftermath of the recent strike attempt by the air traffic controllers. We think the RSB mechanism, or some variant that might be developed from it, has potential for ultimate application to the time slot problem. But as we view it, before such an application can or should be attempted, at least two further developments are necessary. First, at least two additional series of experiments need to be completed. Another series of laboratory experiments should be designed, using larger numbers of participants, resources, and possible package combinations. The subjects in these new experiments should be the appropriate operating personnel of a group of cooperating airlines. Depending on the results of such experiments, the next step might be to design a limited scale field experiment with only a few airports and airlines.
Second, there should be extensive discussion and debate within the government, academic, and airline communities concerning alternative means of implementing the combinatorial auction. There is a wide range of choice here. Our discussion, as well as the reported experiments, were based on the assumption that airline bids would be denominated in U.S. currency and that the revenue would be allocated to the airports. There are, however, other alternatives; we offer just a few to stimulate discussion. (1) If it is believed that airport revenue should not be based on the imputed rents from scarce time slots, then bids in the combinatorial auction could be denominated in "slot currency" or vouchers issued in fixed quantities to each airline. These vouchers could be freely bought and sold among the airlines but would only be redeemable in time slots. (2) Alternatively, each airline could continue to be given some "historical" allocation of slots, with the RSB mechanism modified to become a two-sided sealed bid-offer combinatorial auction. In such an auction each airline would submit package bids for slots to be purchased, and package offers of slots to be sold. Under this form of implementation, the rent imputed to airport slots would of course be retained as "revenue" by the airlines.
(3) An important question not addressed in either the GIP or RSB procedures is the pricing of airline seats, which directly affects the willingness-to-pay for airport slots. We would suggest that the idea of a computerized continuous double (bid-offer) auction of seats be considered along with the combinatorial auctioning of slots. All the major airlines are computerized down to the boarding gate, so that the computerized trading of seats may be technically feasible, and could provide a more flexible means of increasing airline revenue while lowering passenger cost through improved load factors. (4) Finally, we should note that we think there may be an inherent contradiction in the attempt to allow free (deregulated) entry by the airlines, but not permit free entry by airports. Ultimately, a pricing system for airport slots, which returns revenue to the airports, could allow not only for package bids from the airlines, but slot price offers from the airports, with each airport subject to competition from new regional, suburban, and national airports. 
